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1. Introduction 
The first designs of public key cryptosystems (PKC) were based on the (hard to 
invert) trapdoor functions (e.g. [2, 3, 8, 9]). As was pointed out in [4, 51 the basic 
weakness of this approach is that it may be computationally feasible to compute 
some specific bit(s) instead of computing the whole inverse f -’ of the trapdoor 
functionj’. That is, a public key cryptosystem ay be provably secure against an 
attempt o compute the whole information, but may be insecure against an attempt 
to compute some partial information Sb r?le results on the complexity of computing 
specific bits in RSA/Rabin PKCs can be found e.g. in [l, 6,101; for knapsack- 
based PKCs some results can be found in [7]. In order to overcome these difficulties 
in [4, 51 the notion of trapdoor function was replaced by the (unapproximable) 
trapdoor predicate and bit-by-bit probabilistic encryption. Although this approach 
seems to be secure, it is possible to break PKCs in [4, 51 by communication (see [6]). 
In this short article we propose a modified concept of PKCs based on the trap- 
doorfunction which seems to be secure against a communicating adversary. In this 
type of PKC it is possible that not only there are many encryptions of bit 0 and many 
encryptions of bit 1 in the same cryptogram, but also bit 0 and bit 1 can have the 
same encryption while the (legal) decryption is still unambiguous (although rather 
delayed). I-Iere we present only a brief sketch of our idea, one concrete design can 
be found in [ll]. 
A method to break the Soldwasser- 
simple: an adversary C knowing all c 
cryption of one 
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we know from the theory- can increase C’s computing power) C can find out 
whather his message was understandable or not and then he can find out the value 
of one bit of B’s message to A. We conjecture that the main disadvantage of
Goldwasser-Micah’s approach is the independent encryption of each bit. If every 
bit of a message is encrypted (using some one-way function f) independently 
(‘context-free’), then it is possible to decrypt it using communication even if com- 
puting f - t is ~~rov&/y intractable. In our approach we add some ‘links’ (‘context’) 
between bits of a message in order to make a decryption-by-sommunication im- 
possible. 
Let Z be set of integers and f : Z x Z+F be a hard to invert function. We assume 
that using some trapdoor information it is computationally feasible to compute x
from f(x, y) (y is a random parameter), Let M= m lltt2 l m= m, be a message, 
miE (41). 
Encryption 
Step 1. Make a random partition of m 1 m2 l *a m, into a random number of blocks 
of random length each. Make sure that there is at least one O- and one l-bit in each 
block 
for each block do 
choose at random integer k 
for every mi in block do 
if mi= 1 then hi=k 
else hick-1 
Remark. Make sure that for every neighbouring block (k, - k21 > 2 holds 
Step 2. 
fori=l tondo 
choose at random bi 
ci = f (h,bil 
It is clear that it is possible (Step 1) to encrypt different bits (in different blocks) 
into the same value hi. The random parameter bi in Step 2 ensures that there are 
many possible ncryptions of the same hd. 
Decryption. By assumption (i.e. knowing trapdoor information) it is computation- 
ally feasible to compute hi from ci and, then, inverting hi into mi is easy. However, 
decryption is delayed , ii~ it is possible that for some i hi=hi, 1~ *** =hi,j holds 
ahd O~JI after decrypting Ci+ 1 so that hi, 1 I: hi holds one is able to determine the 
Mi-jitli_j+~"*mi_~ rrtimi+l part of the message. Although the partition of a 
into blocks was random, this does not bring any difficulties into the legal 
decryption proce 
It is clear that ve~sary who is able to test whether a< b holds knowin 
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f(a,x), f(b, y) (and not the trapdoor information) is able to compute also a or b 
and so invert f, which has to be a hard task. Here we present only a sketch of the 
idea, so e.g. using Rc versus k- 1 may be questionable (they differ in the last bit), 
but it can be replaced by k versus k - d for some d (and d can be again chosen at 
random for every block or message). If C picks up the encryption of a single bit in 
the communication from B to A, he cannot use it in his (i.e. C to A) communication 
because A can detect (with high probability) this ‘exception from context’. A detects 
this fact regardless of the value of the original bit, so C cannot get 
from A”s answer (if any). 
We want to emphasize that this is a general method, applicable 
functions f (x, y). One concrete design, based on a variant of 
‘number of summands problem’, can be found in [ll]. 
any information 
for any one-way 
knapsack - S.C. 
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